P
aradoxes conflict with preconceived notions of what is reasonable or possible. Hence they are usually identified when empirical observation conflicts with established theory, although in some instances it is theoreticians who uncover the possibility of a paradox first. Such was the case in behavioural ecology with the so-called 'paradoxical ESS' (evolutionarily stable strategy), an evolved behavioural convention dictating that an individual of lower fighting ability, and/or with less to gain from winning a fight, obtains access to a disputed resource at the expense of a more able or motivated opponent (Maynard Smith & Parker 1976) . In hindsight, the behaviour of a social spider reported by Burgess (1976) , in which resident males routinely flee from a hiding place when disturbed by an intruder, seemed to provide an example (Maynard Smith 1982, page 96) . However, important variables require empirical estimation before this interpretation can be fully accepted (Mesterton-Gibbons & Adams 1998). Further empirical examples of paradoxical outcomes have remained exceedingly sparse.
In a recent issue of Animal Behaviour, Hernandez & Benson (1998) report what they speculate is a paradoxical strategy for resolving territorial contests between males in the butterfly Heliconius sara (Nymphalidae). Males have two alternative mating tactics: perching next to a pupa from which a female is about to emerge (here larger males may have an advantage) and defence of a mating territory. The latter involves the resident male engaging intruders in a short circling contest flight, with the loser being escorted out of the territory. In accord with most animal contests, Hernandez & Benson (1998) found that the resident male won the majority (in this case all) of the territory encounters. However, in contrast to both 'common sense' and the majority of empirical studies, small H. sara males had an advantage; it appeared that 'intruders quickly recognized small residents as unfavourable adversaries' (page 537) and abandoned their attempt to acquire the territory. The authors suggest that 'the success of small males may represent a paradoxical strategy (sensu Maynard Smith & Parker 1976), which promotes victory despite lower resource holding power' (page 537).
Here we point out that this suggestion runs contrary to the established definition of a paradoxical strategy for this game, and that the evolution of a paradoxical strategy in H. sara is in any case quite unlikely on theoretical grounds. We begin by briefly recapping the theoretical development of the concept of paradoxical strategies, and after reconsidering Hernandez & Benson's (1998) conclusions, highlight a seeming ambiguity in the definition of paradoxical ESSs. We conclude with a comment on the prospects for actually demonstrating their existence in nature.
The concept of a paradoxical strategy 'evolved' out of early explorations of two models of contest behaviour, the 'hawk-dove' game (Maynard Smith & Price 1973) and the 'war of attrition ' (Maynard Smith 1974) . Various authors later analysed 'asymmetric' contests in which one of the contestants was a better fighter or held a positional advantage (higher resource-holding power, RHP), and/or had more to gain than the other (higher resource value, RV or V) (e.g. Maynard Smith & Parker 1976; Hammerstein 1981; Parker & Rubenstein 1981; Hammerstein & Parker 1982) . As common sense would suggest, in these games where the asymmetries directly affected the chances of winning or the payoff, ESSs were found in which the individual in the 'favoured role' (i.e. the one with a higher RHP or RV, or higher ratio of resource value to cost accrual, V/K), won the contest. Unexpectedly, however, they also discovered that under certain conditions (admittedly evolutionarily restrictive) there existed 'paradoxical' ESSs in which the contestant
